What is the future of aid? What amounts of aid will be necessary in the future? What does it mean "necessary aid", at the bottom line? What kinds of social change can we reasonably expect as the outcome of aid? What is unpredictable about social changes connected to aid?
These are the big questions that most people concerned with aid use to ask. The present paper attempts to answer them partly, with a strong focus on public governance, and on the impact that aid has on the governments of recipient countries.
Aid and social change
Quite a rich body of literature indicates that changing the institutions of recipient countries, which in the jargon of aid is called "capacity building", is the most frequent failure of aid programmes. Still, the problem seems to me more the way aid is given rather than received.
The donors seem to have a systematic problem with walking in the recipients' shoes (see for capacity of the recipients is the process of constitution making in African countries. A number of authors argue that the process has been, so far, largely an attempt to implement, in African societies, institutions fundamentally different from the African tradition. The process can be compared to someone picking up food from an elaborate buffet, in which they don't recognize anything really familiar (Seidman 1987 ). An excellent example is centralization. Most of the early African constitutions were based on the Western institution of central government legitimated by the nation. Still, pre-colonial African societies worked in a different manner: the bulk of legitimacy was attached to local chiefs of individual villages, whilst any type of central, national government was rather of the ephemeral kind, and nobody truly cared to legitimate it (Ndulo 2001) . Thus, principles of centralization that emerge in African countries are, as a matter of fact, a big experiment, which frequently results in excessive concentration of power in the hands of the otherwise quite unstably legitimated President of the Republic.
Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Zambia are good examples.
Facing the challenge of helping the poor, and, in the same time, not to hamper the institutional development of the recipient countries, the usual donors' response is to seek improvement of the policies applied. A fine example of this approach is to find, for example, in Radelet (2004) . The present paper proposes a completely different, novel paradigm of aid. Fault of a better word, we can call this paradigm "orientation on principles", as opposed to orientation on policies. Aid is a long-lasting, global phenomenon. Using the terms of systems theory, in the footsteps of Nicklas Luhmann, we can assume that aid had reached the stage of operational closure already some time ago (Luhmann 1992 ). Both its accumulated experience, and its actual complexity call for passing from the governance based mostly on goal-oriented policies to the one grounded in a well-legitimated, normative base.
On the grounds of the agency theory, it is possible to assume that the natural possession 1 of capital can be the source of social power that we will further name "economic power" (see: Weber (Weber 1920) , and H.L.A. Hart (Hart 1961 ), but mostly that of Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1975 (Habermas , 1979 (Habermas , 1996 . Society needs stabilization in order to deliver the most benefits from association. Social stabilization requires a set of generally recognized rules of conduct.
Some of them are formalized as legal rules, whilst other are the less formalized moral rules.
Generally recognized rules do not emerge randomly. They require a gradual process of social mediation, and communication. That process has its roots in language, which serves as the medium for the discursive emergence of legitimate rules. It is worth to explain the link between legitimation, and legitimacy. Those two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, yet a nuance is to notice. Legitimacy is a state of society at the given moment, whilst legitimation is rather a process. Legitimation brings legitimacy, so to say.
As the stream of aid is allocated, distributed, and received, many social agents are in the temporary, natural possession of the capital goods that aid represents. Correspondingly, many opportunities for economic power arise. Each of them, besides the economic power strictly spoken, is characterized by a certain legitimation, and, consequently, by a certain level of stability. Legitimation of the political system is essentially incremental, i.e. emerging as the result of a long, complex social process, with strong connection to law, and morality. In the ideal state, there is equilibrium between legitimation, and economic power, resulting in wellgrounded political power. From that state of equilibrium, the political system may drift toward two extremes: legitimation without economic power, or economic power over and above the scope of legitimation. The mechanism of sliding off the neighbourhood of equilibrium seems to be attached mostly to the changes in economic power. Legitimation changes slowly, whilst economic power can change faster. One can grasp that difference by comparing the pace, at which constitutions change, with that, at which consecutive, annual budgets are voted.
Governments are structures, not monoliths. They are structured institutionally, and sociologically. The latter is the most interesting at this point. The public sector is a population of people, who in the first place are people as such, with their individual goals, and strategies to achieve them. Those people associate in more or less formal ways, forming coalitions, lobbies, clubs, parties etc. Thus, when we talk about the political power of the government, we mean the power held, acquired and played by many people. A game-theoretic approach can be used to model the transformation of individual strategies into collective political action (see for example : Harsanyi 1953; 1966; 1967; .
The capital brought by the stream of aid can influence the political system in two basic ways. manner, the intensity of aid has significant impact upon the accumulation of both private and publicly held capital in the recipient countries. High intensity of aid in relation to GNI stimulates the formation of private savings, and that of productive assets. Conversely, high intensity of aid in relation to gross capital formation hampers the accumulation of private capital. Clearly, inter-correlation between the two explanatory variables measuring the intensity of aid has limits. It seems that with relatively low savings rates in the given country, when the flow of ODA makes a substantial part of gross capital formation, ODA crowds out private capital in some manner. It is worth noting that results of the tests shown in Table 1 are strongly sensitive to sample selection. Focusing on just one quartile of any of the variables significantly changes both the explanatory power as measured with R 2 , and the T significance of tests, yet not the signs of coefficients. Thus, strong idiosyncrasies are to expect in the sample, probably at the country level.
Justice first -principles before policies
The influence of aid upon the recipient societies depends mostly on its intensity, i.e. on the relative importance of capital provided through aid in proportion to the national income, and to the domestic formation of private capital. Among the biggest recipients of aid, only some receive it in amounts intensive enough to expect any social change at all. India, China, Indonesia, Philippines -these are only a few examples of huge absorption of aid accompanied by so low an intensity that expecting any significant change in response would be irrational. The situation, in which we cannot reliably predict the full social outcomes of a given policy resembles strongly to the veil of ignorance, as defined by John Rawls 4 . The present edssay proposes a paradigm of governing aid definitely oriented on the theory of justice as proposed by John Rawls. The intuition behind the paradigm proposed is that aid, as a global, social phenomenon, has grown old enough to gain its own balance between economic power, and legitimation. The key step to take now is to build legitimation. It is once more worth noticing that legitimation is not the same as legitimacy. The proposition to build legitimation for aid does not mean that aid has no legitimacy. Legitimation means that the so far history of the given social action has allowed building a broad normative base. order of those principles, so that the second one has any relevance only insofar the first principle is satisfied. Yet, the exact problem that we want to address is that many, if not most of aid programs have to operate in a political environment that does not fully comply with the first principle. Aid is focused on distributive justice as encompassed by the second principle, yet it cannot make the whole recipient society more just. Justice is to be sought and found in the very way of donating and distributing aid. The main, long-term goal is to gain durable, sustainable legitimation for aid as a global project.
John Rawls wasn't really explicit on the practical ways of implementing his theory, and on defining the secondary rules of recognition for actual institutions. As for that aspect, the works of Ronald Dworkin, more precisely his critique of the utilitarian approach to law, provide really useful guidelines (see for example : Dworkin 1975 : Dworkin , 1980 . The key recommendations to borrow from Dworkin's approach are the following: put principles before goals, construct principles into institutions, make those institutions so as to allow adjudicating hard cases independently of policy setting.
Thus, the most important step to make consists in using the known history of aid over the last six decades in order to identify the typical conflicts of interests that arise in connection to aid, and to construe a consistent set of rules, possibly recognized as binding rules of international law, to solve those conflicts. The core idea is that, although we cannot remove the paradox of consistent volatility from aid, we should use the quite abundant history of aid as a source of inspiration for the future. The typical field of regulation for such rules would probably the issue know today as "capacity building". The donors expect the institutional changes to go in some definite direction, whilst the recipient country changes in another, divergent direction. Is it fair? Is it just? Should it be the grounds for stopping the flow of aid or reducing it significantly? Today, such conflicts are set at the level of policy making. With all the due respect for the policy makers, the problem is that of a snake biting its tail, over and over again. The policy makers keep on returning to the same starting point in planning institutional changes in the recipient countries, with a very limited capacity to learn on mistakes.
Adjudication, separate and independent from policy-making, is probably the best, institutionalized way to learn on past conflicts and past mistakes. Thus, an international arbitration body could be created to settle disputes that arise on the grounds of conflicting interests in aid programmes. That would create a completely different, institutional setting. courts did, actually. Yet, it is worth once again to bring forth the main argument: aid, as a global activity, needs globally recognized, and the only way to create such a legitimation is to learn consistently on past experience and to communicate that learning in a consistent manner.
